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STUDENT CONTRIBUTION
PRETRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Richard C. Guerriero, Jr. *
THE Terry Doctrine
Since Terry v. Ohio,' the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized that the fourth amendment allows a seizure which falls short of
a full arrest to be justified by a reasonable suspicion which is less than
probable cause. Recent Supreme Court cases dealt with the permissible
extent of a Terry detention, the seizure of personal belongings under Terry,
and the scope of the protective search which is allowed under Terry.
The decision in Florida v. Royer2 is disappointing in that there is
no majority opinion. The defendant was approached in an airport because
he fit a drug courier profile. Information volunteered by the defendant
revealed that he was traveling under an assumed name. The detectives
subsequently removed the defendant to a separate room in the airport
and conducted a consensual search of his luggage. In an opinion by Justice
White, the four members of the plurality agreed that, under the reasonable
belief definition of a stop,3 Royer had been stopped, but that because
he fit a drug courier profile and because he was discovered to be travel-
ing under an assumed name, the stop was justified under Terry. The
plurality held, however, that the justifiable scope of the detention was
exceeded when, despite Royer's explanation for the discrepancy in names,
the detectives, still acting on their initial suspicions, brought Royer to
an interrogation room and retrieved his luggage without his consent. Thus,
Royer's consent to search his luggage was invalid because at the time he
consented he was being illegally detained. Justice Brennan concurred in
the result reached by the plurality. In Justice Brennan's opinion, there
was not sufficient justification for even the initial stop. He did state,
however, that assuming the initial legality of the stop, the subsequent deten-
tion clearly exceeded that authorized by Terry. To this extent Royer is
an indication of the permissible extent of a Terry detention.
Kolender v. Lawson" is not a fourth amendment case, but it does
Copyright 1983, by LomsIANA LAW REVIEW.
*Third-year law student, Louisiana State University.
1. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2. 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
3. Under this definition, an individual is said to have been stopped when a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave. This was the definition given
by Justice Stewart in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). In Royer,
Justice Blackmun, dissenting, agreed with the four members of the plurality that Stewart's
definition of a stop should be adopted, but differed from the plurality in his evaluation
of the facts of Royer under that definition. 103 S. Ct. at 1332-35.
4. 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983).
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concern the protection of an individual's liberty interests after a valid Terry
stop is made. A California statute made it a crime for an individual not
to give "credible and reliable" identification to a police officer who, with
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to justify a Terry
stop, has detained the individual.' The phrase credible and reliable had
been defined by the California courts to mean "carrying reasonable
assurance that the identification is authentic and providing means for later
getting in touch with the person who has identified himself."" Lawson
brought a civil action for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the
facial validity of the statute. Justice O'Connor, writing for a majority
of the Court, found the statute unconstitutionally vague in violation of
fourteenth amendment due process. Although the state required the in-
itial detention to be justified under Terry, the state failed to provide suf-
ficient objective standards for determining when the detainee had iden-
tified himself in compliance with the law. Thus, since full discretion was
accorded to the detaining officer, the requirements of the law varied with
the officer's moment to moment judgment. The statute failed, therefore,
to meet the constitutional requirement of definiteness. Although Justice
O'Connor relied on first amendment rights and the right to freedom of
movement, rather than the fourth amendment,' she pointed out that a
major fault of the statute was that the individual's freedom after the stop
was at the whim of the police officer. This criticism of the statute is con-
sistent with the fourth amendment requirement that the permissible ex-
tent of a Terry stop be judged by an objective standard and be closely
tailored to its justification.'
In United States v. Place," a majority of the Court endorsed an ex-
pansion of the Terry rationale to allow temporary detention of personal
belongings suspected of containing contraband. Place involved another
instance of law enforcement officials trying to discover drug traffickers
in an airport. The issue was whether officials violated the fourth amend-
ment and Terry when they detained Place's luggage for ninety minutes
in order to expose it to a "sniff test" by trained narcotics dogs. The
Supreme Court stated that Terry allows limited intrusions on personal
liberty on less than probable cause, and in the same manner allows a
brief investigative detention of personal property reasonably suspected of
containing contraband. Analogously to the detention of a person, the scope
of the detention of personal property must be limited to the justification
for the detention. Thus, the Court held that although the detention of
personal property may be valid, the ninety-minute detention of Place's
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (West 1983).
6. People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 438, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 873 (1973).
7. 103 S. Ct. at 1859.
8. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
20-23 (1968).
9. 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983).
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luggage was not so minimally intrusive as to be justified by reasonable
suspicion alone.' 0
Despite the extensive discussion by the Place majority, it is arguable
that the expansion of Terry to personal property was unnecessary to the
decision." The majority recognized that the practical effect of detaining
a person's luggage in an airport is to detain the person.' 2 If this is true,
then Place may simply be a case where the detention of the person went
beyond that allowed by Terry, in that the ninety-minute detention exceeded
its justification under ,the circumstances, and thereby became unreasonable.
Nontheless, given the discussion in the majority opinion, and the six
votes in support of it, an expansion of Terry has evidently taken place.
Another important aspect of the majority opinion in Place should
be considered dicta. The majority stated that a "sniff test" by trained
narcotics dogs is not a search within the scope of the fourth amendment
and does not require probable cause. Although the majority attempted
to make this rule part of its holding,' 3 it should be read as dicta. Even
under the majority's expanded interpretation of Terry, the luggage was
being illegally detained when the test was performed. It was unnecessary,
then, to decide whether the test constituted a search. However, since six
members of the Court stated that this principle was part of their holding,
the fact that the principle is technically dicta does not mean that it will
not be respected.
The area that may be searched in a protective search incident to a
Terry stop was expanded in Michigan v. Long.'4 At night, police had
observed Long drive erratically along a rural road and eventually run off
the road into a ditch. As the officers talked to the apparently intoxicated
Long, he began to walk back towards the open door on the driver's side
of the car. Upon seeing a large hunting knife on the floor of the car,
the officers stopped Long and frisked him. Then, while Long and one
officer stood near the rear of the car, the other officer searched the car
for weapons and found' marijuana in an open pouch on the front seat.
The Michigan Supreme Court held that the fruits of the search were in-
admissible because "'Terry authorized only a limited pat-down search of
10. The Court said that the length of the seizure alone demonstrated that the seizure
was unreasonable. Id. at 2645. The Court added, however, that it declined to adopt any
outside time limitation for a permissible Terry stop. Id. at 2646.
11. See id. at 2651-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
12. Id. at 2645.
13. Id. at 2644. The majority stated: "[I]f this investigative procedure [the sniff test]
is itself a search requiring probable cause, the initial seizure of respondent's luggage for
the purpose of subjecting it to the sniff test-no matter how brief-could not be justified
on less than probable cause." Id. This reasoning overlooks the possibility that there might
be a valid Terry detention of the luggage which produces probable cause to search. A re-
cent federal court of appeals decision states that the conclusion in Place (that a sniff test
is not a search) is dicta. United States v. Beale, No. 80-1652 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 1983).
14. 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
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a person suspected of criminal activity' rather than a search of an
area." 
15
The United States Supreme Court reversed noting that roadside en-
counters are particularly dangerous to police officers and that the Chimel
v. California" search incident to arrest had been extended to the inside
of the vehicle in New York v. Belton." Justice O'Connor, writing for
the majority, concluded that:
[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an automobile,
limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hid-
den, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief
based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant" the
officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect
may gain immediate control of weapons."8
The search of a vehicle following a Terry stop is not automatically per-
missible, however, and thus must be distinguished from the Chimel-Belton
search incident to arrest. 9 Although the search following a Terry stop
and the search incident to arrest are both justified by the interest in pro-
tecting police officers, the need to locate and preserve evidence is an ad-
ditional justification for the search incident to arrest. Since the interest
in preserving evidence has not yet developed when a Terry stop is made,
there must in fact be a reasonable belief that weapons are accessible to
the defendant in order to justify the search. According to Justice O'Con-
nor, the facts did justify a reasonable belief that Long would pose a danger
if he were allowed to re-enter his vehicle; therefore, the search was valid.
Whenever a Terry stop is made of a driver, there is the possibility
that the driver will re-enter his vehicle (since the police do not yet have
probable cause to arrest). Thus, this aspect of the justification for search-
ing the vehicle in Long will always be present. The distinction between
the Belton search and the Long search is important, however, because
of the possibility in the latter of a valid Terry stop when there is not
a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed or has access to weapons.2 0
Several recent Louisiana cases have also discussed the Terry doctrine.
State v. Williams" contains a survey of Louisiana cases determining what
constitutes reasonable cause under article 215.1 of the Louisiana Code
15. Id. at 3478 (quoting People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 472, 320 N.W.2d 866, 869
(1982) (footnote omitted)).
16. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
17. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
18. 103 S. Ct. at 3480 (footnote omitted) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).
19. Id. at 3480 n.14.
20. Some Louisiana cases had already reached results similar to that in Long, without
going quite as far. See State v. Williams, 421 So. 2d 874 (La. 1982); State v. Reed, 388
So. 2d 776 (La. 1980).
21. 421 So. 2d 874 (La. 1982).
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of Criminal Procedure, Louisiana's statutory equivalent of Terry. The
survey is revealing in that it shows how difficult it may be for a police
officer or a court to decide when there is reasonable cause. For example,
whether the suspect walks away or runs away when he sees the police
is an important distinction. It may also be important to determine whether
the suspect was engaged in mere suspicious activity or in suspicious con-
duct in a "high crime area." This is not to suggest that such distinctions
do not exist or that they are not important, but only to illustrate the
great extent to which each case rests on its facts and how they are
characterized.
In Williams, the officers saw three men talking to two other men
who were in a parked car at midnight in a New Orleans housing project.
The officers observed one of the three men reach inside the car. Suspect-
ing a drug deal, the officers approached the men. The three men on foot
attempted to leave, and one of them put his hand to his mouth and
swallowed. The men in the car likewise attempted to leave. The Loui-
siana Supreme Court held that at this point there was reasonable cause
to stop all five men.
In contrast to Williams, the court in State v. Phipps22 held there was
not reasonable cause to stop the defendants when the only facts presented
in support of the officer's belief that criminal activity was involved were
that four young people were walking along the street at 1 A.M. on the
Sunday before Mardi Gras.
More recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted a three part
analysis to be used in determining whether a permissible Terry stop has
been made. In State v. Flowers,2 3 which involved a Terry stop of a car,
the court thoroughly discussed the Terry jurisprudence and concluded:
Thus, there are at least three inquiries involved in determining
whether a seizure was a valid investigatory stop: (a) whether the
intrusion was an arrest or a stop; (b) whether the stop was of
a type which is reasonable in view of the public interest served
and the degree of invasion entailed; and (c) whether the particular
stop was warranted by a reasonable suspicion, based on articulable
facts and rational inferences from these facts.2'
The court also stated that an additional "implicit consideration" is the
seriousness of the criminal conduct under investigation. 5
In deciding whether there was an arrest requiring probable cause or
only a stop, the court indicated that the following facts would.be rele-
vant: whether the suspect was simply questioned on the scene or was taken
22. 429 So. 2d 445 (La. 1983).
23. No. 82-KA-2621, slip op. (La. Sept. 2, 1983).
24. Id. at 7.
25. Id. at 7 n.l.
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to a police station, whether the suspect was told or given the impression
that he was free to go (or would be shortly), whether he would have in
fact been restrained if he had attempted to leave, whether the officer in-
tended to make an arrest or a stop, the length of the stop, whether a
search was made, and the amount of force used.
Determining whether a stop was of a reasonable type requires balanc-
ing the government's interest in investigating and preventing crime against
the individual's privacy interest. The court's consideration of the
seriousness of the offense being investigated is important here.2 6 The im-
plication seems to be that an intrusion on privacy which would be pro-
hibited, given a routine investigation of a non-violent crime, would not
be prohibited if a serious violent crime were being investigated. This ap-
proach is subject to the criticism that it makes a person's constitutional
right to freedom and privacy dependent on the seriousness of the crime
of which he is suspected.
Finally, the Flowers court noted that for a particular stop to be
reasonable, the detaining officer must "have knowledge of specific, ar-
ticulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant the 'stop.'"27 Such facts may come from per-
sonal observation or from an informant, but the test for reasonable cause
will vary depending on the source of the information.
RANDOM VESSEL STOPS
The rule of Delaware v. Prouse2 ' that the police cannot randomly
stop vehicles to check license and registration does not apply to vessels.
Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in Prouse, wrote for the majority in
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,2 9 which held that pursuant to a
federal customs statute officials could stop and board a vessel which had
access to the open sea even though there was no prior suspicion of criminal
activity and the boarding was not pursuant to any system of spot checks.
Justice Rehnquist based his holding on the factual distinctions between
vessels and automobiles. Fixed checkpoints, or spot checks, according to
Justice Rehnquist, are not practical for vessels since they do not travel
on "established avenues," they are difficult to spot, and ready access to
the open sea would allow vessels to avoid the checkpoints.3" In addition,
Justice Rehnquist noted that the registration of vessels is more difficult
to check by visual observation than that of vehicles. As historical support
for his argument, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that a similar statute had
26. Id. at 9.
27. Id. at 10.
28. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
29. 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983).
30. This point is contradicted somewhat by the fact that the vessel in Villmnonte-Marquez
was located in a ship channel which was the only channel leading to the open sea. Id. at 2576.
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been passed in 1790 by the same Congress which promulgated the fourth
amendment. For these reasons, and because the government's interests
are especially great where vessels are involved, 3' the situation is
distinguishable from that in Prouse. Thus, random stops of vessels which
have access to the open sea are not unreasonable or in violation of the
fourth amendment.
BEEPERS
A "beeper" is a small, easily hidden radio transmitter which emits
periodic signals allowing it to be located with a radio receiver. In United
States v. Knotts,32 a majority of the Supreme Court held that the use
of a beeper to track a person traveling on public highways was not a
search under the fourth amendment. With the permission of a chemical
supply company, state narcotics officers placed a beeper in a drum of
chloroform, which was then sold to Knotts' co-conspirator. By monitor-
ing the beeper the officials were eventually able to locate the drum at
Knotts' cabin. Through visual surveillance the officers were then able to
obtain enough information for a search warrant and to eventually discover
that Knotts was manufacturing illegal drugs. Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, found that use of the beeper did not involve a search
because the destiny of the drum could have been discovered by visual
surveillance of the co-conspirators' travels on public highways. Since there
is not a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information conveyed
by such movements in public, there was no violation of the fourth amend-
ment when a beeper was used to obtain the same information. The Court
made several broad statements, including: "Nothing in the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed
upon them at birth . . . ."" and "scientific enhancement of this sort
raises no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also
raise."'
There are two important limitations to the holding in Knotts. First,
the beeper in Knotts was used only to track movements of the drum in
public. The beeper was not relied on to reveal movements or conduct
occurring inside the cabin where there would be a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Secondly, the warrantless installation of the beeper in the drum
was not challenged by Knotts because it was believed he had no standing
31. Vessel documentation involves a number of important government interests such
as regulation of fishing, enforcement of environmental laws, and preventing the entry of
illegal aliens and drugs. Id. at 2581.
32. 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983).
33. Id. at 1086. On this point Justice Rehnquist cites the "search light" case, United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927), and the "pen register" case, Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735 (1979). The later case of Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983), is in accord.
See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
34. 103 S. Ct. at 1087.
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to make such a challenge." In a Louisiana court, the defendant clearly
would have standing to challenge the warrantless installation under arti-
cle I, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution. Moreover, immediately
following Knotts, the federal Fifth Circuit held that "a warrant based
upon probable cause is required to install and maintain an electronic track-
ing device within the interior of a vehicle or other conveyance for an
extended period of time." 36 Due to these limitations, the extent to which
police may permissibly use beepers is still uncertain.
PLAIN VIEW
Although twelve years have passed since the plurality decision in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire,3 the United States Supreme Court is still
unable to agree on when evidence or contraband is properly seized because
it is in plain view. In Coolidge, four members of the Court agreed that
in order for a seizure of contraband or evidence to be valid, three prereq-
uisites must be met: (1) there must be a prior valid intrusion or a lawful
right to be in the place from which the plain view occurred, (2) the
discovery must be unanticipated and inadvertant, and (3) it must be im-
mediately apparent that the items observed are contraband or evidence
of a crime.8
In the recent case of Texas v. Brown,39 the only point of agreement
was on what "immediately apparent" does not mean. Brown was stop-
ped one night at a routine driver's license checkpoint. The police officer
shined his light into Brown's car and saw "an opaque, green party balloon,
knotted about one half inch from the tip." ° Brown opened the glove
compartment to get his license, and the officer observed more balloons
and some loose white powder. The green balloon was seized and later
discovered to contain heroin. The officer testified that he knew balloons
were frequently used to package narcotics. The state appellate court held
that in order for the evidence to be "immediately apparent," the officer
35. Id. at 1084.
36. United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139, 1150 (5th Cir. 1983). The holding of Butts
is only applicable where the beeper is installed in the interior of the vehicle. Previously,
the Fifth Circuit had held that the warrantless installation of a beeper to the exterior of
a vehicle based only on reasonable suspicion did not violate the fourth amendment. United
States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1982).
After Butts, the problem of distinguishing the exterior of a vehicle from its interior is bound
to arise. Consider, for example, beepers installed under the hood or in the trunk. In addi-
tion, the Butts court itself stated that there may be exceptions to the warrant requirement
for the interior of the car. 710 F.2d at 1150 n,16. All of these possibilities simply add
to the confusion.
37. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
38. Id. at 465-74.
39. 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983).
40. Id. at 1538.
[Vol. 44
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 1982-1983
had to know that it was contraband. The implication was that the officer
had to actually see the contraband or be as certain as if he had seen
it. The Supreme Court reversed, with all of the Justices agreeing that
the state court had interpreted Coolidge too strictly and that the contra-
band did not have to be visible."
Although all nine of the Justices concurred in the judgment, the Court
split seriously on the general analysis of the case. Justice Rehnquist and
the plurality emphasized that Coolidge was only a plurality case and im-
plied that the three-part test was subject to serious question. Justice Rehn-
quist also stated that plain view should not be considered as an indepen-
dent exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. In
response, Justice Powell, for himself and Justice Blackmun, said that plain
view was an exception and that it was unnecessary to criticize Coolidge
after it had been generally accepted for more than a decade. Justice
Stevens, by contrast, felt it was necessary to discuss the case in light of
the "container" jurisprudence and the particular problems posed when
a plain view case involves a container. Thus, Texas v. Brown may result
in a renewal of the uncertainty of the plain view doctrine.
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
On original hearing in State v. Reeves, "2 the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that the warrantless electronic surveillance of conversations between
an undercover agent of the state, who consented to the surveillance, and
the defendant, who was unaware of the surveillance, violated the defen-
dant's right to privacy in his communications under article I, section 5
of the Louisiana Constitution. On rehearing the court reversed its original
holding and held that warrantless one-party consensual electronic
surveillance of conversations does not violate the Louisiana Constitution.
This holding is in accord with the federal rule set forth in United States
v. White."3
In White a plurality of the United States Supreme Court found that
the fourth amendment was not violated by warrantless consensual
surveillance, because a party to a conversation accepts the risk that his
listener may betray his confidences to the police, and because there is
no constitutionally recognizable difference between an electronically equip-
41. There was no agreement as to what level of knowledge is required before the con-
traband nature of the item is immediately apparent. Justice Rehnquist said that probable
cause to associate the item with criminal activity was the standard. Id. at 1542-43 (citing
Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (per curiam); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 588 (1980)). Justice Rehnquist also stated, however, that probable cause might not
be required in all cases. Id. at 1542 n.7. Justice Powell said only that if probable cause
was required it had been shown. Id. at 1545.
42. 427 So. 2d 403 (La. 1982).
43. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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ped and an unequipped agent of the police. Justice Blanche, in his rehear-
ing opinion in Reeves, agreed with the strict holding of White but chose
to vary from its reasoning, relying instead on the two-part test of Katz
v. United States"" to find that the defendant did not have a recognizable
expectation of privacy under the Louisiana Constitution.
Justice Blanche's opinion on rehearing drew only four votes; there
were four rehearing opinions, with two very strong dissents. The holding
of Reeves has been reaffirmed, however, in the recent case of State v.
Terracina."5
INVENTORY SEARCHES OF CONTAINERS
The idea of an inventory search is usually relied on to allow the police
to search lawfully impounded cars. Neither a warrant nor probable cause
is required for an inventory search. The inventory of a vehicle's contents
by the police is said to be a reasonable search under the fourth amend-
ment because of the need to protect the owner from theft, to protect
the police from claims for lost property, and to protect the police from
danger."
Inventory searches are not limited to vehicles. In Illinois v. Lafayette,"7
the defendant was arrested for disturbing the peace and taken to the police
station. In the booking room, the defendant's person and a shoulder bag
he had brought with him were searched. Illegal drugs were found in the
bag. Defendant challenged the search of the bag, and the state contended
that it was an inventory search. The United States Supreme Court agreed
with the state, holding that "it is not 'unreasonable' for police, as part
of the routine procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested person, to
search any container or article in his possession, in accordance with
established inventory procedures.""' The Court found that the search was
justified by the same need for protection from theft, property claims, and
dangerous instrumentalities which justifies inventory searches of impounded
vehicles. The Court also held that although the same interests could have
easily been protected by less intrusive measures (such as locking the bag
in a locker), the fourth amendment does not require that the government
44. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Justice Harlan, who concurred with the Katz majority, stated
the test as follows: "My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions
is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. at 361.
45. 430 So. 2d 64 (La. 1983).
46. See generally South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); Cady v. Dom-
browski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
47. 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983).
48. Id. at 2611.
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choose the least intrusive alternative. It would be too great a burden on
the police to require that the search be anything other than "reasonable."
INVENTORY SEARCHES OF VEHICLES
To show that a valid inventory search of a vehicle has been made,
the Louisiana jurisprudence has required the state to establish that the
impoundment of the vehicle was necessary and that the inventory of the
vehicle's contents was also necessary and reasonable in its scope."9 Whether
the impoundment-inventory procedure was necessary depends in part on
whether the vehicle could have been safely left where it was stopped and
whether the defendant was willing to waive the inventory and any claims
for loss.5" Three recent cases bear on these points.
In State v. Osbon," the defendant was arrested for driving while in-
toxicated. At the time of the arrest the defendant had parked his car in
a department store parking lot. The police told the defendant that if some-
one did not come for the vehicle it would be impounded. Although the
defendant insisted that he wanted the car to remain where it was, the
police impounded and inventoried the vehicle, finding marijuana. The
Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal set aside the defendant's con-
viction, finding that the marijuana should have been suppressed because
the inventory search was not necessary. The court said that there was
no indication that the car could not have been left where it was with
reasonable safety and without interfering with traffic. The court also noted
that the defendant was not given an opportunity to waive the inventory
even though his request for the car to be left where it was amounted
to a waiver of any claim for loss.
State v. Sims52 presented a somewhat similar situation to the Loui-
siana Supreme Court. Again, the defendant who was arrested for driving
while intoxicated had asked that his car not be moved but (apparently)
was not given an opportunity to waive impoundment and inventory. The
defendant's car was parked on the shoulder of a highway. The court found
that the inventory and impoundment were valid, emphasizing that the car
could not be safely left where it was. The court also stated that although
the officer had done no more than tell the defendant that his car would
be inventoried, the officer's failure to ask the defendant whether someone
could come for the car did not invalidate the search since the officer's
true purpose was merely to inventory the vehicle, not to search for
evidence. Presumably, the court considered the officer's failure to ask
49. See State v. Crosby, 403 So. 2d 1217 (La. 1981); State v. Jernigan, 390 So. 2d
1306 (La. 1980); State v. Jewell, 338 So. 2d 633 (La. 1976).
50. See cases cited supra note 49.
51. 426 So. 2d 323 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
52. 426 So. 2d 148 (La. 1983).
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the defendant whether he wanted to waive the inventory to be inconse-
quential as well.
Following Sims, the second circuit had another opportunity to discuss
the law of inventory searches. In State v. Moak," the defendant's vehicle
was parked at a gas station. He asked that his sister be allowed to come
for the vehicle, but the police denied the request because the sister lived
twenty miles away. The defendant was not asked if he desired to waive
the inventory. The second circuit held that the vehicle could not be left
safely where it was because valuables could be seen inside the vehicle and
because the vehicle might interfere with operation of the gas station the
next day. The court also found that it would have been unreasonable
to make the police wait for the defendant's sister to come from twenty
miles away. Finally, the second circuit held that the failure to give the
defendant an opportunity to waive the inventory did not invalidate the
search because the officer's purpose in making the inventory was to pro-
tect the defendant and the public. The court relied on the implication
in Sims that an inventory conducted in good faith may overcome a failure
to give the defendant an opportunity to waive the inventory.' 4
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR A SEARCH WARRANT AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
After nearly twenty years of viability, the two-pronged test of Aguilar
v. Texas" and Spinelli v. United States 6 has been abandoned by the
Unites States Supreme Court in favor of a totality of the circumstances
test. The Aguilar-Spinelli test was. used to decide when information sup-
plied by a confidential informant and presented to the magistrate by a
police officer-affiant was sufficient to constitute probable cause for a
search warrant. The two-pronged test required (1) that the basis of the
informant's knowledge be set forth, and (2) that the informant's credibility
or the reliability of his information be demonstrated. In Illinois v. Gates,7
the Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test." Probable cause from an
informant may now be found, without adherence to any strict rules, simply
by looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the informa-
tion given.
In Gates the police received an anonymous letter which gave the names
53. 427 So. 2d 1233 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
54. Id. at 1236.
55. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
56. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
57. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
58. The Court had been expected to rule on the much discussed issue of whether there
should be a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The Court decided, however,
that the issue was not properly before the Court. Justice White, who thought that the issue
had been properly raised, argued in favor of adopting the good faith exception in his con-
currence. Id. at 2336-51.
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and address of the husband and wife defendants, stated that they dealt
in drugs brought up from Florida, and explained their method of opera-
tion. Allegedly the wife would drive the car to Florida with the husband
following by plane. After the drugs were bought, the husband would bring
them back in the car and the wife would fly back. The letter also predicted
that the couple would go to Florida to buy drugs on a certain date.
Upon investigating the information contained in the letter, the police
learned that the defendants did live at the stated address. On approx-
imately the day predicted, the police confirmed the husband's plane trip
to Florida and learned that he had checked into a hotel room registered
in his wife's name. The next day the couple left the motel together in
the car, apparently heading back to Illinois. An affidavit setting forth
this information and a copy of the anonymous letter were presented to
a judge who issued a search warrant for the defendants' house and car.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's suppression of
the marijuana and other contraband seized pursuant to the warrant," find-
ing that probable cause had not been established under the Aguilar-Spinelli
test. The court specifically found that neither prong of the test had been
satisfied, even considering the corroborating information in conjunction
with the letter.
In an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the state court, stating:
[A]n informant's "veracity," "reliability" and "basis of knowl-
edge" are all highly relevant in determining the value of his
report. We do not agree, however, that these elements should
be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements
to be rigidly exacted in every case . . . . [T]hey should be
understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully
illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is
"probable cause" to believe that contraband or evidence is located
in a particular place.6"
Thus, an informant's tip is now to be evaluated by examining the "totality
of the circumstances" surrounding the tip.
Justice Rehnquist gave a number of reasons for adopting the totality
of the circumstances approach. The new approach, according to Justice
Rehnquist, is more consistent with the "practical," "commonsense" defini-
tion the Court has given to probable cause and with the idea that prob-
able cause is a matter of probability, not certainty. In addition, the two-
pronged test was an inaccurate measure of probable cause since it would
not allow a particularly strong finding under one prong to compensate
59. People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981).
60. 103 S. Ct..at 2327-28.
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for a deficiency under the other prong. The Court also noted that impos-
ing highly technical requirements for affidavits was inappropriate since
they were usually drafted by nonlawyers in the haste of a criminal in-
vestigation. Finally, Justice Rehnquist stated that the two-pronged test
seriously impeded law enforcement.
Applying the new standard to the facts of the case, Justice Rehnquist
found that there was probable cause for the search. Even without the
anonymous letter, he stated, the couple's activities suggested that they
might be involved in the transportation and sale of illegal drugs. Moreover,
it was proper for the magistrate to rely on the anonymous letter. The
letter had been corroborated sufficiently to show that the informant was
somewhat reliable, even if he would not have been considered reliable
under Aguilar. "It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause,
that 'corroboration through other sources of information reduced the
chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale,' thus providing 'a substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay.' "61 Furthermore, the details and accurate
predictions established a fair probability that the informant had a suffi-
cient basis of knowledge, even if it would have been inadequate under
Aguilar. Thus, there was a substantial basis for concluding that there was
probable cause to search.
Gates is a radical change in the law relative to search warrants and
confidential informants. The traditional two-pronged test has been replaced
by a rather indefinite "totality of the circumstances test." Yet, Gates does
not merely provide a less technical method for finding probable cause.
The case seems to change the meaning of "probable cause" by reducing
the level of justification that is required for the issuance of a search war-
rant. Notably, the circumstances in Gates did not warrant a finding that
either of the Aguilar-Spinelli prongs had been met. If the Court really
is lowering the standard for probable cause, it has failed to give an ex-
planation for why there should be a lesser standard. One fears that the
dissent is correct in stating that "[wiords such as 'practical,' 'nontechnical,'
and 'commonsense,' as used in the Court's opinion, are but code words
for an overly permissive attitude towards police practices in derogation
of the rights secured by the fourth amendment." 2
Presumably, the Louisiana Supreme Court will follow the change in
Gates without finding that the 1974 Louisiana Constitution incorporated
the Aguilar-Spinelli test by implication. In State v. Lingle, 3 the Loui-
61. Id. at 2335 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 271 (1960)).
62. Id. at 2359 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. 436 So. 2d 456, 460 (La. 1983); see also State v. Rodrigue, 437 So. 2d 830 (La.
1983); State v. Roffin, 434 So. 2d 1246 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983). Rodrigue also restated
the proposition of State v. Haynie, 395 So. 2d 669, 672 (La. 1981), that information not
included in the warrant but conveyed orally to the judge may be used to support a finding
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siana Supreme Court cited Gates with approval, making particular
reference to the "commonsense" interpretation of probable cause.
WARRANTS BASED ON INCORRECT OR TAINTED INFORMATION
In order for a search warrant to be validly issued, it must be based
on probable cause established by "the affidavit of a credible person,
reciting facts establishing the cause for issuance of the warrant."" A war-
rant is not necessarily invalid, however, if the information contained in
the affidavit is false or was obtained illegally. State v. Patterson65 illustrates
the treatment of affidavits containing misstatements or material
omissions. 6 A prerequisite to validation of such a warrant is that the
misstatements or omissions were made without an intent to deceive. If
that requirement is met, the court which is determining the validity of
the warrant is to treat the affidavit as if the misstatements had been ex-
cluded and the material omissions included. Reading the affidavit in this
manner, if the court nonetheless finds probable cause, then the warrant
is valid.
Another possibility is that the evidence contained in the affidavit was
obtained through an illegal search or seizure. In this case, the warrant
may still be valid if the same information was obtained from an indepen-
dent source unconnected with the illegality, or if the connection between
the illegality and the information is "so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint." ' 61 In State v. Roubique," the court relied primarily on the indepen-
dent source doctrine. A sheriff's officer obtained information from an
illegal search of the defendant's property. The same officer had, however,
later received much of the same information from a confidential infor-
mant. The affidavit was written so that it appeared that the affiant was
basing his conclusions largely on the information given by the informant.
Since information establishing probable cause had been obtained from
an independent source, the court held that the warrant was valid. It should
be noted that the court found there was no intentional misrepresentation
by the officer.
of probable cause for an arrest warrant. That rule does not apply to search warrants. See
State v. Klar, 400 So. 2d 610 (La. 1981); State v. Daniel, 373 So. 2d 149 (La. 1979); LA.
CONST. art. 1, § 5; LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 162.
64. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 162.
65. 422 So. 2d 1131 (La. 1982).
66. See also State v. Lingle, 436 So. 2d 456 (La. 1983); State v. Lehnen, 403 So. 2d
683 (La. 1981); State v. Rey, 351 So. 2d 489 (La. 1977). Note that the Louisiana rule is
stricter than the federal rule. Under federal law, a search warrant is not automatically in-
validated if the affidavit contains intentional misrepresentations. Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154 (1978).
67. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); State
v. Marshall, 359 So. 2d 78 (La. 1978).
68. 421 So. 2d 859 (La. 1982).
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SEARCH OF A CONTAINER AFTER CONTROLLED DELIVERY
Illinois v. Andreas9 involved a rather specialized type of search. When
a common carrier or a customs official lawfully discovers contraband in
a container, the container is sometimes resealed and delivered to its destina-
tion so that police can identify the individual(s) responsible for the
transportation of the contraband. 0 After such a "controlled delivery"
is made, the container must be searched a second time in order to link
the individual with the contraband. The issue in Andreas was whether
the warrantless second search of a container after its controlled delivery
to the defendant violated the fourth amendment.
Analogizing to the plain view doctrine,7 Chief Justice Burger found
for a majority of the Court that "[n]o protected privacy interest remains
in contraband in a container once government officers lawfully have
opened that container and identified its contents as illegal." 72 Thus, so
long as the police know that there is contraband in the container, there
are no fourth amendment privacy interests which may be violated.
However, because the police will temporarily lose contact with the con-
tainer when executing the controlled delivery, certainty that the contra-
band is still in the Container at the time of the second search is impossi-
ble. The question becomes, then, at what point is the probability that
the container still contains the contraband so diminished that privacy in-
terests reattach to the container. In answer to this question, the Supreme
Court held that a legitimate expectation of privacy does not return with
respect to the container until there is a "substantial likelihood that the
contents have been changed."" The Court found that such a substantial
likelihood was not present under the facts in Andreas because the con-
tainer was of an unusual size and had a specialized purpose, and because
police had only lost sight of the container for forty-five minutes.
ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS AFTER ILLEGAL ARREST
When a person is arrested without probable cause, his subsequent con-
fession will be inadmissible unless the state can show that the connection
between the arrest and the confession is so attenuated that the confession
could not logically be considered the fruit of the illegal arrest."' Some
of the factors which should be considered in deciding whether there is
69. 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983).
70. Id. at 3322-23.
71. Id. at 3324. The Court cites Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
72. 103 S. Ct. at 3323.
73. Id. at 3325.
74. See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200 (1979); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); State v. Leatherwood, 411 So. 2d 29
(La. 1982).
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attenuation are the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession,
the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy
of any official misconduct.75 Several recent Louisiana cases bear on the
issue of what is necessary to establish sufficient attenuation.
In State v. Serrato, 6 the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the
defendant's confession was -sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest.
The court based its decision on the facts that over twenty-one hours had
passed between the arrest and the confession, that the defendant had been
given his Miranda" rights a number of times, and that the defendant
twice signed an interrogation agreement. The court also emphasized that
there was a lack of any flagrant official misconduct and that the defen-
dant freely submitted to the interrogation, knowingly and intelligently waiv-
ing his rights.
Insufficient attenuation was found, however, in State v. Arceneaux.7 '
After finding that the arrest was illegal, Justice Marcus, writing for the
majority, held that the defendant's inculpatory statement was not suffi-
ciently attenuated from the arrest. Justice Marcus pointed out that the
confession was made only two hours after the arrest and that the "defen-
dant was arrested without probable cause in the 'hope that something
might turn up."' 79 This latter point is particularly important in that
it demonstrates the weight given to the official misconduct factor.
VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSIONS
The claim that a confession was not voluntary may be based on the
fact that the defendant was drugged or intoxicated or affected by some
other adverse mental or physical condition at the time of the confession.
Although such claims met with little success in the past year, the cases
illustrate the rules and factors applicable when the defendant asserts that
his confession was made involuntarily.'" The burden is on the state to
prove that a confession was made voluntarily.' However, the mere fact
that the defendant had ingested drugs or alcohol, that he had fought with
the police, or that he had mental problems will not establish the involun-
75. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604-05 (1975).
76. 424 So. 2d 214 (La. 1982).
77. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
78. 425 So. 2d 740 (La. 1983).
79. Id. at 744 (quoting Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691 (1982)). In State v.
Walker, 430 So. 2d 1327 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983), the state attempted to use a second
statement made by Arceneaux six hours after the arrest against a codefendant. The court
of appeal suppressed the second statement, relying largely on the supreme court's decision
in Arceneaux.
80. See State v. Thompson, 429 So. 2d 862 (La. 1983); State v. Burkhalter, 428 So.
2d 449 (La. 1983); State v. Narcisse, 426 So. 2d 118 (La. 1983); State v. David, 425 So.
2d 1241 (La. 1983).
81. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 703(D); LA. R.S. 15:451 (1981).
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tariness of the confession. Factors to be considered in determining whether
the defendant's confession was voluntary are as follows: whether he ap-
peared rational and coherent at the time, the clarity and detail of his
statements, the certainty with which he waived his rights, and whether
there are witnesses to the defendant's condition at or near the time of
the confession other than police officers. Finally, it should be noted that
considerable deference is given to the trial court's determinations, especially
in matters of credibility.
THE Edwards v. Arizona INITIATION STANDARD
The United States Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arizona82 held:
[WhIen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present
during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right can-
not be established by showing only that he responded to further
police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised
of his rights. . . . [and] that an accused . . . having expressed
his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not
subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel
has been made available to him, unless the accused himself in-
itiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with
the police.83
Recent United States Supreme Court and Louisiana Supreme Court cases
have treated the issue of what constitutes an Edwards "initiation."
In Oregon v. Bradshaw," the United States Supreme Court decision
was split four-one-four, with the result that no majority holding was pro-
duced. The defendant had been arrested and questioned until he requested
counsel, at which point questioning ceased. Later, as he was being moved
to a different jail, the defendant asked, "Well, what is going to happen
to me now?" 5 Although the police officer told the defendant that he
was under no obligation to talk, a conversation ensued in which the police
officer suggested that the defendant take a polygraph test. The defendant
later waived his Miranda rights and took the test, after which he con-
fessed to the crime.
Writing for the four member plurality, Justice Rehnquist stated that
under Edwards, an "initiation" is not equivalent to a waiver of the right
to have counsel present during questioning. Thus, Edwards requires a two-
part analysis. The court must determine, first, whether the defendant has
initiated a conversation with the police, and, second, whether, even if
82. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
83. Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added).
84. 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983).
85. Id. at 2833.
[Vol. 44
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LA W, 1982-1983
initiation is shown, the defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to have counsel present during questioning. According to Justice
Rehnquist and the plurality, the defendant's question did initiate further
conversation with the police. The plurality stated that "initiate" should
be interpreted in the ordinary dictionary sense of the word, 6 but did not
go so far as to say that any statement would qualify as an initiation.
A routine inquiry such as asking for a drink of water or to use the
telephone would not be an initiation under the plurality's standards. With
respect to the second part of the analysis, the plurality found that, given
the totality of the circumstances, the defendant had waived his rights.
Thus, the plurality considered the statements to be validly obtained under
the rules set forth in Edwards. Justice Powell, who evidently still disagrees
with the rationale of Edwards, concurred with the judgment of the plurality
because the circumstances showed a valid waiver of the right to have
counsel present during questioning."8
In an opinion by Justice Marshall, the four dissenters agreed with
the plurality that Edwards requires a two-step analysis and that the issue
of waiver should be decided by examining the totality of the
circumstances. 8 Therefore, Bradshaw at least establishes these two general
principles. The dissenters disagreed, however, on the definition of initia-
tion. In their view "initiation" refers to a communication about the sub-
ject matter of the criminal investigation. Since the context of Bradshaw's
statement indicates that he only wanted to know where the police were
taking him, the dissenters found that there had not been an initiation.
In an earlier per curiam decision, Wyrick v. Fields,9 the issue raised
was whether, after the defendant had clearly initiated further discussion,
he had waived his right to have counsel present during questioning. The
defendant argued that although he had agreed to take a polygraph test
and had waived his right to have counsel present at the test, his waiver
did not extend to post-test questioning which sought an explanation for
deceit shown by the test. The Court held that in view of the totality of
the circumstances, the waiver was intended to extend to the entire inter-
rogation, including the post-test questioning. The Court added that it would
have been unreasonable for the defendant and his attorneys to assume
that the defendant would not be asked to explain any unfavorable results
of the test.
The Louisiana Supreme Court also had occasion to apply Edwards.
In State v. Germain,9" questioning of the defendant, who was suspected
86. Id. at 2835.
87. Id. at 2836 (Powell, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 2840 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. 103 S. Ct. 394 (1983).
90. 433 So. 2d 110 (La. 1983).
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of beating his stepchild to death, ceased when he asked for a lawyer.
Shortly thereafter, however, the defendant said, "I was in the hospital
for three weeks and I told them I needed help, but they laughed at me." 9'
Although he was then told that he did not have to say anything, the defen-
dant asked, "I want to know if I caused this; is this because of me?" 92
The court found that the defendant did initiate the conversation and that
the statements were therefore admissible. Although it is somewhat unclear,
the court apparently also found that the defendant had waived his right
to have counsel present during questioning.
In contrast to Germain, there was a clear Edwards violation in State
v. Arceneaux." There the court found that Edwards was violated where,
following the defendant's request for an attorney, he was interrogated
without benefit of counsel and without having initiated the conversation
himself.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has recently ruled on the retroactivity
of Edwards v. Arizona. In State v. Shea9" and State v. McCarty," the
court stated that it would not apply Edwards retroactively because the
rule established in Edwards was a "clear break with the past." Edwards
will be applied only prospectively from the date of the decision, May 18,
1981.
OTHER ASPECTS OF Miranda
In addition to the Edwards initiation cases, recent Louisiana cases
addressed other aspects of the fifth amendment and Miranda v. Arizona."6
Miranda requires that before an accused person in police custody may
be questioned, he must be warned of his rights. Among other things, the
accused must be told that he has a right to remain silent and that anything
he says may be used against him. In State v. Mitchell,' the defendant
had shot his wife and fled to Arkansas. The Arkansas authorities were
unaware of the shooting, but the defendant was stopped by an Arkansas
police officer for traffic violations.
[The officer] ordered the defendant out of the car, and the defen-
dant surrendered reluctantly as he exited the vehicle with a whiskey
bottle in hand. As [the officer] handcuffed the defendant, he
91. Id. at 114. The court evidently believed the police officer and not the defendant
with respect to who spoke first.
92. Id.
93. 425 So. 2d 740 (La. 1983).
94. 421 So. 2d 200 (La. 1982).
95. 421 So. 2d 213 (La. 1982). The United States Supreme Court recently decided to
consider the issue of whether Edwards v. Arizona applies retroactively. Stumes v. Solem,
671 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3568 (1983).
96. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
97. 437 So. 2d 264 (La. 1983).
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noticed dried blood on the defendant's head, neck, and back. [The
officer] asked, "What happened?" to which the defendant replied,
"My wife shot me." [The officer] then asked the defendant
whether he had also shot his wife, to which the defendant replied,
"Yeah." When asked where he had last seen his wife, the defen-
dant responded that he had last seen her "lying on the kitchen
floor coughing." 9
At no point during this questioning was the defendant informed of his
Miranda rights.
The Louisiana Supreme Court found the statements admissible because
the questioning did not constitute custodial interrogation within the mean-
ing of Miranda. The court based its conclusion on two related considera-
tions. First, the court said that the possibility that the defendant or a
third party had been seriously wounded justified the questioning. No cases
are cited on this point, nor is the implication that there may be an
emergency exception to Miranda discussed.99 Second, the court said that
at the time of the questioning, the defendant was not under investigation
for shooting his wife. Since the defendant was not the focus of an in-
vestigation of the particular crime to which his statements pertained, the
officer's questions did not involve custodial interrogation such that
Miranda was applicable. The court indicated that police investigations of
potential criminal activity would be greatly inhibited if the police had to
give Miranda warnings to everyone they questioned during a general in-
vestigation. The court was unwilling to impose that burden on the police,
especially where there was apparently an emergency justifying the general
investigation.
The arguments made by the court in Mitchell break new ground. To
the writer's knowledge, the Louisiana jurisprudence has not previously
recognized an emergency exception to Miranda. Moreover, the cases which
permit questioning of an unwarned defendant during a general investiga-
tion are all cases where the defendant was not in custody.'10 Perhaps in
98. Id. at 266.
99. See State v. Loyd, 425 So. 2d 710, 719 (La. 1982) (Lemmon, J. concurring); cf.
State v. Brown, 340 So. 2d 1306 (La. 1976); State v. Levy, 292 So. 2d 220 (La. 1974).
100. The court cited several cases in support of its theory that Miranda did not apply
where the defendant was not the focus of an investigation. See State v. White, 399 So.
2d 172 (La. 1981); State v. Thompson, 399 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1981); State v. Ordonez, 395
So. 2d 778 (La. 1981); State v. Green, 390 So. 2d 1253 (La. 1980); State v. Rogers, 324
So. 2d 403 (La. 1975). In none of these cases was the defendant in custody, however. In
addition, in State v. Thompson the court even said: "Any inquiry or remark made by the
police to a person after he is in custody will be deemed the equivalent of custodial inter-
rogation where it is shown that the police inquiry or remark is reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response." 399 So. 2d at 1167 n.2. The question, "Did you shoot your
wife?" asked to the handcuffed Mitchell would seem to fit the Thompson definition of
custodial interrogation. It should also be noted that the court's fear that police investiga-
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recognition of the novelty of its reasoning, the court added that even if
the questioning was prohibited under Miranda, admission of the statements
was harmless error since there were other admissible statements to the
same effect.
Another principle of Miranda is that a person in custody has a right
to "cut off questioning" by indicating that he wishes to remain silent."'
This right must be "scrupulously honored" by the police." 2 In State v.
Loyd,"' the issue was whether the defendant's right to cut off question-
ing had been properly honored. The defendant, who was in custody, was
suspected of kidnapping a three-year old girl the day before. The girl
had not yet been found and the police believed she might still be alive.
After the defendant invoked his right to remain silent, police questioning
ceased. The defendant's mother, however, asked to talk to him. The police
allowed her to see her son and asked her to get her son to reveal the
girl's location. After a second visit, the defendant's mother told the police
her son had agreed to talk to them. The police then resumed questioning
of the defendant and were eventually led to the girl's body. The court
found that the defendant's. right to cut off questioning had been
scrupulously honored because there was no police questioning until the
defendant agreed to talk. The court emphasized that the questioning by
the defendant's mother did not invoke Miranda since she was not a police
officer. Miranda is concerned with the combined effect of police custody
and police interrogation. Custody alone is not so intimidating as to pre-
vent a finding that the police scrupulously honored the defendant's rights.
Thus, since there was no police interrogation until the defendant indicated
that he wanted to talk, the defendant's right to cut off questioning was
scrupulously honored. 0
STANDING: THE LIMITS OF LOUISIANA'S BROAD RULE
Article 1, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution provides in part:
Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted
in violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegal-
ity in the appropriate court.'
tions would be inhibited if Miranda were found applicable is not entirely supported by the
facts since Mitchell was in custody. A holding that Miranda applied to custodial question-
ing would not interfere with a general on scene investigation which only involved the non-
custodial questioning of witnesses.
101. 384 U.S. at 473-74.
102. Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
103. 425 So. 2d 710 (La. 1982).
104. The requirement that the police scrupulously honor the rights of an accused who
has invoked his right to silence should be contrasted with the higher standard of Edwards,
supra text accompanying notes 82-93, which applies when a defendant invokes his right
to have counsel present during questioning.
105. Emphasis added.
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This provision gives defendants much broader standing than they would
have under federal law,1 0 6 but it has now been held to apply only where
the illegality complained of is a wrongful search or seizure. In State v.
Burdgess,"'° the defendant sought to prevent the involuntary statements
of a codefendant from being used against him. The supreme court stated
that the defendant had no standing to object to the codefendant's state-
ment, even though the statement may have been obtained without proper
compliance with the procedural requirements of Miranda or otherwise in
violation of the fifth or sixth amendments.108 The court stated that the
framers of the Louisiana Constitution did not intend to give expanded
standing to defendants except as provided in article I, section 5.9 The
court did, however, reserve judgment on the "question of whether gross
police misconduct against third parties in the overly zealous pursuit of
criminal convictions might lead to limited standing."" 0
State v. Walker' illustrates the limits of Louisiana's broad standing
quite clearly. The prosecution sought to use the statements of a codefen-
dant against the defendant. The statements were obtained in violation of
the codefendant's fifth amendment right to have counsel present during
interrogation. However, the statements were also obtained pursuant to
an illegal seizure since the codefendant had been arrested without prob-
able cause. The third circuit held that the defendant had no standing to
assert the inadmissibility of the statements against him on the first ground,
but that the defendant did have standing to attack the statements as the
fruit of an illegal seizure in violation of section 5. The third circuit's
holding is consistent with the supreme court's ruling in Burdgess.
CHOICE OF LAW
Choice of law is a seldom discussed and unclear area of the law as
is evident from two decisions in the past year. In State v. Rivers,"' the
court stated: "Since this search occurred in Alabama, we are not con-
cerned with the provisions of the Louisiana Constitution."" 3 No reasons
were given in support of this conclusion. Then, in State v. Smith," 4 in
which the search occurred in Texas, the court cited federal, Louisiana,
and Texas authorities in support of its decision." 5 Which law was actually
applied is unclear.
106. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
107. 434 So. 2d 1062 (La. 1983).
108. Id. at 1064.
109. Id. at 1065.
110. Id.
111. 430 So. 2d 1327 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983),
112. 420 So. 2d 1128 (La. 1982).
113. Id. at 1132.
114. 433 So. 2d 688 (La. 1983).
115. Id. at 692.
19831
636 LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 44
Admittedly, the tendency of the states to adopt federal search and
seizure law as their own law detracts from the significance of the prob-
lem. Nonetheless, there are important variations of the law among the
states. A prime example of this is the expanded standing a defendant has
under article I, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution. In fact, the ap-
plicability of that provision was at issue in Rivers. Since choice of law
problems are bound to arise again, it would be best if a specific rule
or approach were adopted. It is interesting to note that many of the prin-
ciples in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws may be applicable
to criminal cases.' '
6
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2, comment c (1971); J. HALL,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 23:8 (1982).
